Resilient Control Strategy for Cyber-Physical Systems Against False Data Injection Attacks

With the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, it has become necessary to connect traditional industrial control systems to the network, leading to the integration of control systems (IoT, 20XX). This integration has given rise to a new architecture known as cyber-physical systems (CPS), which allows for the online monitoring and control of various edge subsystems by cloud controllers (CPS1, CPS2, 20XX).

However, the connectivity of networks also exposes control systems to vulnerabilities and network attacks (Security, 20XX). These attacks encompass various forms of malicious interference or destruction, including denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and deception attacks, with false data injection attacks being a commonly encountered type (Attacks, 20XX). To mitigate the detrimental impact of network attacks on cyber-physical systems, a game of offense and defense arises between attackers and defenders (Game, 20XX).

As defenders in the field of control systems, our responsibility is to safeguard the system's last line of defense. This involves employing resilient strategies to minimize the effects of attacks when the system inevitably falls victim to network attacks (Resilient, 20XX). Therefore, by identifying attack models, we propose a resilient control strategy based on tube methods and buffer mechanisms. This strategy aims to reduce the impact of false data injection attacks on the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel and safeguard the system's performance from severe damage.